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ACTS OF FINANCIAL DISTRESS IN THE EU: IS THE EU
TO BLAME?
Venetia Argyropoulou†
Abstract: This Article seeks to determine if there is a legal basis for European
Union (“EU”) Institutions to be held accountable for measures taken by an EU Member
State in cases of financial distress. The Article begins by exploring the concept of
sovereignty and then evaluates the limitations placed on state sovereignty by participation
in the EU. Next, it explores the definitions of economic coercion and countermeasures
and considers whether the actions taken by EU institutions in the context of the Cyprus
banking haircut would satisfy either of these definitions. Lastly, this Article studies
whether EU law can provide a basis for liability of EU institutions in case of acts adopted
by such institutions to address a financial crisis in a manner that targets the rights of
investors and, in particular, in the Cyprus Banking Haircut.
Cite as: Venetia Argyropoulou, Acts of Financial Distress in the EU: Is the EU to
Blame?, 27 WASH. INT’L L.J. 485 (2018).

I.

INTRODUCTION

There is no question that, in cases of extreme financial crisis,
investors’ expectations and the value of their investments may be greatly
affected by actions taken by the state. However, before investors can seek
recourse there are several important elements to consider. Apart from the
procedural and substantive legal hurdles an investor will face, investors must
also determine the parties/persons against which investors’ claims will be
raised. Indeed, establishing the relevant party is of material importance; it
determines competent courts, applicable law, and available property for
enforcement. At first glance, the question of the suitable defendant appears
easy to answer, as in most cases the negative measures were adopted by the
States themselves.
However, this presumption of state responsibility was challenged in
the 2013 Cyprus banking crisis that led to the haircut1 of deposits in
Cyprus’s two largest banks. Indeed, Cyprus’s president proclaimed that the
decision for the haircuts actually was imposed by European Institutions.2
This Article explores such allegations. Additionally, in the case of sovereign
default within the European Union (“EU”), this Article attempts to answer
†

Lecturer, European University of Cyprus; PhD, Tilburg University.
A haircut is the difference between prices at which someone can buy or sell a security.
2
See President Nicos Anastasiades, Address to the People of Cyprus (Mar. 17, 2013) (stating that
Eurogroup had given him two blackmail-style options, either disorderly bankruptcy or the depositors’ bail
in).
1
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the question of whether the EU can be held accountable for investors’ losses.
In response to the above question, Part II of this Article explores the concept
of sovereignty vis-à-vis a state’s participation in international organizations,
with a focus on the EU. In Part III, this Article studies the negative aspect of
sovereignty, namely the principle of non-intervention, which protects a state
from external interference by other sovereign states. In this context, this
Article reviews the notion of economic coercion and examines whether it
constitutes such prohibited intervention. In Part III, this Article explores
whether the recent banking haircut in the eurozone, especially the Cyprus
banking haircut, can be attributed to the EU and its institutions on the basis
of economic coercion. Lastly, the Article explores whether the EU and its
institutions can be held liable for the Cyprus banking haircut under EU Law.
II.

THE NOTION OF SOVEREIGNTY
A.

The History of the Concept of Sovereignty

To explore whether liability can be attributed to the EU for the Cyprus
banking haircut and the EU can therefore serve as a defendant, the notion of
sovereignty is of vital importance.
The notion of sovereignty is
controversial and has puzzled law scholars and political scientists almost
since the inception of international law itself.3 The concept of sovereignty
first arose in Rome. However, the Roman understanding of sovereignty
lacked a definite theory of how sovereignty is created.4 The current concept
of sovereignty arose much later, in the 16th and 17th centuries.
In the 16th century, in Les Six Livres de République, Jean Bodin
recognized sovereignty as the absolute and perpetual power of a state to set
binding laws, limited only by the laws of God and natural law. 5 Thomas
Hobbes, a century later, indicated that the sovereignty of the state is an
absolute power superior to all, having a right over all.6 While both these
theories conceptualize sovereignty as the absolute power of the state, they
differ in how they treat powers outside of the state. Specifically, Jean
Bodin’s theory identified sovereignty as an unlimited power subject to
3

Helmut Steinberger, Sovereignty, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol. IV 501
(Rudolph Bernhardt 1st ed., 2000).
4
C. H. McIlwain, A Fragment on Sovereignty, 48 POL. SCI. Q. 94, 96 (1933).
5
Richard McKeon, Book Review, 74 ETHICS 74, 74–75 (1963) (reviewing JEAN BODIN, THE SIX
BOOKS OF A COMMONWEALE (1576)).
6
THOMAS HOBBES, THE CITIZEN Ch. 6 ¶¶ 12-15 (Bernard Gert ed., Thomas Hobbes trans., 1972)
(1651).
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neither external powers nor human laws.7 On the other hand, Hobbes
considered sovereignty an absolute power within the state’s territory but
failed to address the relationship of sovereignty to international law and
international organizations.8
Most scholars9 trace the modern concept of sovereignty to the end of
the Thirty-Years’ War and the Treaty of Westphalia.10 The Treaty of
Westphalia laid the ground for states to become “sovereign and
independent” from the Holy Roman Empire.11 These states were sovereign
in the sense that they enjoyed “supreme authority” over internal affairs
within their territory and independence in their external relations.12 Such
authority was secular, derived out of self-assertion and survival, rather than
stemming from religious grounds.13 The Treaty of Westphalia recognized
states were equal regardless of their form of governance or their allegiance
to the Catholic or Protestant Church.14 As a consequence of these concepts
of sovereignty and equality, the principle of non-intervention, or the idea
that other states cannot interfere in a state’s internal affairs, is now a wellestablished principle of international law.15
B.

The Current Concept of Sovereignty

Since the Treaty of Westphalia, case law and scholarly research have
extensively explored the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention.
7
URMILA SHARMA & SUDESH KUMAR SHARMA, PRINCIPLES AND THEORY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
145 (2000); see also William C. van Vleck, Book Review, 44 HARV. L. REV. 317, 317 (1930) (reviewing
CHARLES GROVE HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS (1930)) (stating that Bodin’s
philosophy “tended to discredit the old natural law ideas and to make the state the sole source of law”).
8
See HOWARD WARRENDER, THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF HOBBES: HIS THEORY OF OBLIGATION
119 (1970) (analyzing what Hobbes considered international relations and the causes for the war among
nations).
9
See ROBERT ROSWELL PALMER & JOEL COLTON, A HISTORY OF THE MODERN WORLD 148 (1992)
(noting the elements of statehood can be traced before that time); but see K. J. Holsti, Book Review, 1
JAPANESE J. POL. SCI. 157–72 (2000) (reviewing STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED
HYPOCRISY (1999)).
10
G. John Ikenberry, Book Review, 80 FOREIGN AFF. 157 (2001) (reviewing DANIEL PHILPOTT,
REVOLUTIONS IN SOVEREIGNTY: HOW IDEAS SHAPED MODERN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (2001)).
11
D. W. Greig, Book Review, 58 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 366, 366–68 (1988) (reviewing ANTONIO
CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD (1986)).
12
DJURA NINČIĆ, THE PROBLEM OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE CHARTER AND IN THE PRACTICE OF THE
UNITED NATIONS 5 (1970).
13
Helmut Steinberger, Sovereignty, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol. IV 501
(Rudolph Bernhardt, 1st ed. 2000).
14
BRIAN R. URLACHER, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AS NEGOTIATION 19 (2015).
15
Michael Wood, Non-Intervention (Non-interference in domestic affairs), ENCYCLOPEDIA
PRINCETONIENSIS, https://pesd.princeton.edu/?q=node/258 (last visited Nov. 27, 2017).
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However, despite this analysis, both concepts continue to be fluid and
puzzling. The first case to set out a widely-accepted definition of
sovereignty was the Island of Palmas Arbitral Award of 1928. The award
stipulated that “[s]overeignty in the relations between states signifies
independence. Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the right
to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other state, the functions of a
state.”16 As the Palmas case indicates, independence is inherently linked
with the element of territory in the sense that, for an entity to be
independent, it should be able to freely dispose of its own territory without
external interferences.17
This definition also directly linked sovereignty with the concept of
statehood, although the two concepts are not identical. Indicatively, Article
1 of the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States of 1933,
which echoes customary international law, defines a state as a person of
international law which possesses: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined
territory; (c) government in the sense of dominion; and (d) capacity to enter
into relations with other States.”18 Indeed, it is a principle of international
law that sovereign states enjoy absolute dominion within their territory
without external intervention.
C.

The Sovereignty of International Entities

These definitions focus on states. However, they do not indicate
whether international entities other than states may enjoy sovereignty in the
sense described above. This question is of particular relevance in relation to
international organizations, particularly the EU.
EU institutions possess unusual powers and traits, including, inter
alia, citizenship, the lack of internal borders within member states, and the
development of a supranational legal system of “EU law.” 19 However, such
powers and traits were awarded to the EU by the member states through
international conventions rather than arising as inherent EU characteristics.

16

Island of Palmas Case (U.S. v Neth.), Hague Ct. Rep. II RIAA 829, 838 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928).
Geert Van Calster, International Law and Sovereignty in the Age of Globalization, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 106 (Aaron Schwabach & John Cockfield eds., 2009).
18
Convention on Rights and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 165 U.N.T.S. 19.
19
See Case 6/64, Costa v. E.N.E.L., 1964 E.C.R. 587 (" . . . the EEC Treaty has created its own legal
system which . . . became an integral part of the legal systems of the Member States and which their courts
are bound to apply.").
17
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In particular, the Treaty of Rome,20 the Treaty of Maastricht,21 and the
Treaty of Lisbon22 created the EU institutions which enjoy these powers and
thus played a large role in the creation of the EU.
Prior to these treaties, the powers listed above were exercised by the
governments of each member state. Through these treaties, states agreed to
award such powers to EU institutions. As with any other international
treaty, the obligations assumed by the states through these treaties are
mandatory on the basis of states’ consent and the well-established
international law principle “pacta sunt servanda.”23 In this sense, no
member state can enjoy sovereignty in the sense described above—an
absolute power free from external interventions—as, inter alia, member
states have delegated their sovereignty to the EU and share that power in
certain policy areas.
The EU has led scholars to question the previous definition of
sovereignty and consider alternative theories of sovereignty that will
adequately include the EU in their ambit. Bodin’s unitary and indivisible
nature of sovereignty does not allow for delegation of powers by a state to
an external authority and therefore could not address the current situation
with the EU.24 In response, scholars have invoked other theories of
sovereignty, such as pooled sovereignty.25 Indeed, the EU is considered a
prominent example of pooled sovereignty,26 or “poly-centered sovereignty.”
In the model of pooled sovereignty, the powers are both disaggregated and
reaggregated. They are disaggregated in the sense that the state does not
enjoy exclusive authority over its policies,27 while they are reaggregated in
the sense that EU regulations and directives are adopted by the EU

20

Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 294 U.N.T.S. 3.
Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7,1992, 1755 U.N.T.S. 3.
22
Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the
European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2702 U.N.T.S. 3.
23
FABRIZIO CAPOGROSSO, SHARED SOVEREIGNTY AND DENATIONALISATION OF STATEHOOD IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION 11 (2008).
24
See generally STEPHEN D. KRASSNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY (1999).
25
See NANNERL O KEOHANE, PHILOSOPHY AND THE STATE IN FRANCE 71 (1980) (stating "we see the
principal point of sovereign majesty and absolute power to consist in giving laws to subjects in general,
without their consent"); see also Robert Keohane, Ironies of Sovereignty: The European Union and the
United States, 40 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 743, 743–65 (2002).
26
Pooled
sovereignty,
OXFORD
INDEX
,
http://oxfordindex.oup.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100336931 (last visited Nov. 30, 2017).
27
Hadii M. Mamudu & Donley T. Studlar, Multilevel Governance and Shared Sovereignty:
European Union, Member States, and the FCTC, 22 GOVERNANCE 73, 73–97 (2009).
21
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institutions and apply uniformly to all member states.28 In pooled
sovereignty, states remain sovereign but contractually delegate their powers
to an external institution. The external institution operates collectively, as it
is comprised by all member states, and sets policies that may differ from
each individual state’s ideal standpoint in the interest of international
cooperation and collective good.29
Some commentators suggest that pooled sovereignty is not an
appropriate concept for the EU because this type of sovereignty is exercised
by several actors and is therefore unable to address the current status of the
EU, especially the Economic Monetary Union (“EMU”).30 On one hand, the
transfer of sovereignty within the EU exceeds mere “pooling” in the area of
monetary policy, as monetary authority is exercised almost exclusively at an
EU level. On the other hand, in areas such as fiscal policy, power is mostly
exercised by the states independently.31 Some commentators argue that, in
such a case, sovereignty is divided: certain competencies are prerogatives of
the State, while others belong to the EU. 32
Even this notion appears simplistic and falls short of addressing the
shared competencies that belong both to the states and to the EU.33 In
response, scholars developed the theory of cooperative sovereignty. Here,
sovereign states collaborate with other sovereign entities while applying the
same rules and principles as in a pluralist constitutional order.34 Instead of
being applied in an hierarchical order, these rules work toward the same end,
namely the fulfilment of their shared sovereign values, including a common
market free from internal borders, common agriculture and fishery policies,
and common minimum standards on human rights.35 Scholars have
criticized this as “unsound,” because sovereignty in itself cannot be
28

Thomas W. Pogge, Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty, 103 ETHICS 48, 48–75 (1992); See also
Neil Walker, Late Sovereignty in the European Union, in SOVEREIGNTY IN TRANSITION 15 (Neil Walker
ed., 2006).
29
Nicolas Jabko, Which Economic Governance for the European Union? Facing up to the Problem
of
Divided
Sovereignty,
SWEDISH
INST.
FOR
EUR.
POL’Y
STUD.
13
(2011),
http://www.sieps.se/sites/default/files/2011_2_1.pdf.
30
Samantha Besson, Sovereignty in Conflict, EUROPEAN INTEGRATION ONLINE PAPERS (2004),
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2004-015a.htm.
31
Jabko, supra note 29, at 13.
32
Id.
33
Enzo Cannizzaro, Introduction to THE EUROPEAN UNION AS AN ACTOR IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS xiv (Enzo Cannizzaro ed., 2002).
34
NEIL MACCORMICK, QUESTIONING SOVEREIGNTY: LAW, STATE, AND NATION IN THE EUROPEAN
COMMONWEALTH 203 (2002).
35
See id.; Besson, supra note 30, at 14.

April 2018

Is the EU to Blame?

491

divided.36 Dividing sovereignty would undermine the nature of sovereignty
as an absolute power, as it is only competencies that can be limited.37
Nonetheless, cooperative sovereignty supports the notion that competencies
can be delegated, because delegation is nothing more than a demonstration
and reaffirmation of sovereignty.38
While it is clear that the concept of sovereignty is unresolved,
particularly in terms of the EU, a few conclusions can be drawn.
Specifically, sovereignty allows a state, in such fields and policy areas where
it has not delegated authority to other institutions, to regulate its internal
affairs free from external interferences. The EU is a unique case. The EU
enjoys sui generis powers similar to the sovereignty awarded by the member
states through international conventions.
III.

THE NEGATIVE ASPECT OF SOVEREIGNTY
A.

The Non-Intervention Principle

As noted above, sovereignty entails absolute dominion over a state’s
territory, free from any external interference by other sovereign states. The
definition of sovereignty thus implies that sovereign states have a negative
obligation not to interfere in the internal affairs of other states, as all states
are equal. The principle of non-intervention constitutes one of the
fundamental norms of international law. In fact, many scholars, such as
Antonio Cassese and Jianming Shen, argue that the principle of nonintervention has risen to the status of jus cogens.39 The principle is
embodied in the Charter of the United Nations. Although the Charter does
not explicitly refer to non-intervention, it can be inferred from Articles 2(4)
and 2(7).40 It can also be inferred from the Friendly Relations Declaration.41
36

See Martin Loughlin, Why Sovereignty?, in SOVEREIGNTY AND THE LAW: DOMESTIC, EUROPEAN
46 (Richard Rawlings et al. eds., 2013).
37
Id. at 47.
38
Id.
39
ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD 147 (1986) (“The importance of
this principle [of nonintervention] for States leads one to believe that it has by now become part and parcel
of jus cogens.”); Jianming Shen, The Non-Intervention Principle and Humanitarian Interventions under
International Law, 7 INT’L LEGAL THEORY 1, 5 (2001); see also 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 428
(Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 2008) (stating that the principle "is a corollary of every
state's right to sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence").
40
Philip Kunig, Prohibition of Intervention, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Apr. 2008), http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law9780199231690-e1434?prd=EPIL.
41
G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), at 121–24 (Oct. 24, 1970).
AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES
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The principle of non-intervention is explicitly identified in the UN
General Assembly Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and
Interference in the Domestic Affairs of States.42 Furthermore, Article 32 of
the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States prohibits “the use of
economic, political or any other type of measures to coerce another State in
order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign
rights.”43 The principle was also recognized by the International Court of
Justice (“ICJ”) in its very first case, Corfu Channel, United Kingdom v.
Albania.44
Finally, the principle was emphasized in the renowned judgment in
Nicaragua vs. United States. There, the court determined that “the principle
of non-intervention involves the right of every sovereign State to conduct its
affairs without outside interference; though examples of trespass against this
principle are not infrequent, the Court considers that it is part and parcel of
customary international law.”45 The Court later states “the principle forbids
all States or groups of States to intervene directly or indirectly in the internal
or external affairs of other States” and that:
[A] prohibited intervention must accordingly be one bearing on
matters in which each State is permitted, by the principle of
State sovereignty, to decide freely. One of these is the choice
of a political, economic, social and cultural system, and the
formulation of foreign policy. Intervention is wrongful when it
uses methods of coercion in regard to such choices, which must
remain free ones . . . the element of coercion . . . defines, and
indeed forms the very essence of, prohibited intervention.46
According to Professor Antonios Tzanakopoulous, a scholar and
author in this area, the Court in the Nicaragua case recognized that states
enjoy an area of freedom where each respective state may act alone in the

42

G.A. Res. 2131 (XX), at 11–12 (Dec. 21, 1965).
G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), at 50–55 (Dec. 12, 1974).
44
Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Merits, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4, ¶ 121 (Apr. 9, 1949) (The Court
proclaimed “the alleged right of intervention as the manifestation of a policy of force, such as has, in the
past, given right to the most serious abuses and as such cannot, whatever be the present defects in
international organization, find a place in international law.”).
45
Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
Merits, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 202 (June 27).
46
Id. at ¶ 205.
43
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manner it pleases stemming from that state’s sovereignty.47 That area
includes fiscal, tax, and foreign policy and the free choice of political,
economic, social, and cultural systems.48 Within that area, as discussed
above, no external intervention is permissible. However, that freedom may
be circumscribed by obligations assumed by states through international
treaties.
Despite the seemingly-established status of the principle of nonintervention, as will be demonstrated below, the actual content of the nonintervention principle is unclear.49 Additionally, the principle has been set
aside or abused several times by states with significant economic power
through economic coercion.50
Contributing to the lack of clarity on the principle of non-intervention,
case law is limited to few cases with very specific fact patterns.
Indicatively, the ICJ has only examined three cases relating to the principle
of non-intervention, namely the Corfu Channel case,51 the case of Nicaragua
v. United States of America,52 and the case of DRC v. Uganda,53 all of which
had very specific facts that related to the use of military force. 54 Thus, in
light of the limited caselaw, there is no consensus on what constitutes
intervention, and therefore which intervention is not allowed under
international law.55 For the purposes of this study, this Article will focus
only on the notion of “economic coercion,” which constitutes a form of
prohibited intervention.
47
Antonios Tzanakopoulos, The Right to be Free from Economic Coercion, 4 CAMBRIDGE J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 616, 618–19 (2015).
48
Id.
49
See generally Oliver J. Lissitzyn, Book Review, 76 HARV. L. REV. 668 (1963) (reviewing MYRES
S. MCDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE LEGAL
REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION (1961)).
50
See generally T. Akinola Aguda, Book Review, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 284 (1987) (reviewing
DILEMMAS OF ECONOMIC COERCION: SANCTIONS IN WORLD POLITICS (Miroslav Nincic & Peter
Wallensteen eds., 1983)).
51
See generally Corfu Channel, supra note 44 (referred to U.K.’s unauthorized entry into the
territorial waters of Albania, so as to look for mines that would be brought as evidence before the I.C.J.).
52
See generally Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua,
supra note 45 (related to armed activities taken by U.S. military forces against the Nicaraguan
Government).
53
See generally Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo
v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. Rep. 168 (Dec. 19, 2005) (related to the presence and action of the
military forces of Uganda on the borders of eastern Congo).
54
NATALINO RONZITTI, COERCIVE DIPLOMACY, SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 6 (2016).
55
JOHN CHARVET & ELISA KACZYNSKA-NAY, THE LIBERAL PROJECT AND HUMAN RIGHTS 275
(2008); one exception is the use of force which is specifically prohibited under Art. 2.4 of the UN Charter.
U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
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Economic Coercion

Defining economic coercion is not an easy task, as a large portion of
the actions taken by states to optimize their economic self-interests leads to
detrimental consequences for other states.56 Economic coercion can include
all methods traditionally used for economic compulsion.57 In fact, since
World War II, economic relations among states have been shaped by the
practice of economic coercion.58 Clearly not every action that falls into this
category can be deemed illegal. Rather, only those practices that are
unnecessarily or unreasonably destructive to the essential values of an
innocent target state, or which might significantly endanger international
peace, are prohibited.59
Professor Derreck Bowett suggested that the decisive element of
whether various economic measures should be considered illegal coercion
depends on if the action taken by the involved state can be attributed to an
improper motive or intent.60 Put simply, an act on its own cannot be
coercive, but it may become illegal coercion upon proof of improper motive
or purpose.61 Since a state’s mens rea is not easy to deduce, let alone prove,
Professor Bowett indicated that “it will require a great deal of practice, of
‘case-law’, to give the concept of illegal economic coercion substance and
definition.”62
Another criterion that was suggested to determine whether economic
measures could constitute illegal coercion is whether the state imposing the
measures does so to obtain “advantages of any kind” while subordinating the
sovereignty of the state upon which the coercion is inflicted. 63 Again, this
criterion is vague, as economic measures cannot be deemed illegal on the
sole basis that they convey advantages to the acting state while damaging the
interests of another state, particularly given the competition existing between
56

See Lissitzyn, supra note 49.
Comment, The Use of Nonviolent Coercion: A Study in Legality under Article 2(4) of the Charter
of the United Nations, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 983, 991 (1974).
58
See Aguda, supra note 50.
59
Paul Stephen Dempsey, Economic Aggression & Self-Defense in International Law: The Arab Oil
Weapon and Alternative American Responses Thereto, 9 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 253, 261 (1977).
60
Derek Bowett, Economic Coercion and Reprisals by States, 13 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 5 (1977).
61
Edwin Ifeanyichukwu Nwogugu, Legal problem of foreign investments, in 153 RECUEIL DES
COURS: COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, at 253 (1983).
62
See Bowett, supra note 60, at 4.
63
See, e.g., G.A. Res. 3171 (XXVIII), at 52–53 (Dec. 17, 1973); Andre Beirlaen, Economic
Coercion and Justifying Circumstances, 18 REV. B.D.I. 57, 67 (1984).
57
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various economies.64 According to Professor Tzanakopoulos, a decisive
conclusion can be inferred from Article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, which refers to the case when a State is coerced to enter
into an international treaty. In such a case, the treaty is nonetheless valid
unless coercion was exercised by threat or use of force.65
“Force” refers to any military force or physical force, used or
threatened. However, it is unclear whether economic or political force is
included in the definition of “use of force.” The definition of “force”
becomes essential in such a case, as a literal interpretation of the word might
lead to the conclusion that force is limited to armed force, while a broader,
liberal interpretation of the term would include political and economic force.
This matter troubled the states when negotiating the Vienna Convention,66
but the choice of words of Article 52 demonstrates their unwillingness to
clear up this matter.67
As might be expected, the scholars are divided on this topic. Some
commentators support the view that political and economic pressure is not
included in the notion of force.68 Others argue that the term “force” should
not be limited to military action, but should also include economic and
political coercion that may endanger international peace, security, or
justice.69 This view is supported by the Separate Declaration on the
Prohibition of Military, Political and Economic Coercion in the Conclusion
of Treaties, which was separately adopted in 1969 by the delegates of the
UN Conference on the Law of Treaties.70 The declaration specifically
64

See Beirlaen, supra note 63, at 69.
See Tzanakopoulos, supra note 47, at 621.
66
In the first session of the International Conference held to formulate the Draft Articles on the Law
of Treaties into an International Treaty in 1968, the meaning of coercion was deliberated in great detail. In
this regard, Article 49 of the Draft Articles (current Article 51) was proposed to be amended by the 19th
Amendment so that economic and political pressure would be included. This issue was discussed in the
fiftieth meeting, held on May 3, 1968, but no consensus could be reached. See K.R. Vivek, Coercion:
Economic and Political Pressure, 1 “UGDAM VIGYATI” - THE ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE 1, 2 (2015) (India).
67
Robert E. Dalton, Book Review, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 898, 898–903 (2012) (reviewing THE
VIENNA CONVENTIONS ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY (Olivier Corten & Pierre Klein eds.,
2011)).
68
See, e.g., LASSA FRANCIS & LAWRENCE OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE.
DISPUTES, WAR AND NEUTRALITY (Hersch Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1952); C.H.M. Waldock,
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condemns “the threat or use of pressure in any form whether military,
political or economic by any State in order to coerce . . . .”71
In all cases, the equation of coercion with illegal intervention should
be interpreted to mean that anything short of coercion, e.g. mere interference
with a state’s choices, is lawful, so long as the interfering state does not
breach any of its own obligations under international law.72 Thus,
identifying the scope of what is considered coercion is necessary to
determine whether recent haircuts in the eurozone, and especially the Cyprus
banking haircut, can be attributed to the EU and its institutions on the basis
of coercion.
IV.

THE FACTS OF THE CYPRUS HAIRCUT

Cyprus is the third smallest country in the EU and is located in the
northeastern Mediterranean Sea, to the south of Turkey. Although it joined
the EU as a de facto divided island, the entire country is part of the EU
territory.73 Cyprus is a well-established financial and investment center due
to its investor-friendly tax regime and, up to 2013, it had a strong financial
and service sector.
In March 2013, Cyprus was shocked when the national government
decided to close Cyprus’ second largest bank, Cyprus Popular Bank
(“CPB”), imposed a depositor bail-in on the deposits of Cyprus’ largest
bank, Bank of Cyprus (“BOC”), and imposed capital controls on all deposits
in Cyprus banks. Other authors have explored reasons behind the financial
and banking crisis in the Republic of Cyprus.74 This Article explores
whether the banking haircut was a product of coercion by the EU’s
institutions, especially the European Central Bank (“ECB”) and the Council
of the EU, as was contemplated by the President of Cyprus, Mr.
Anastasiades.75
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The problems faced by the two major banks in Cyprus did not appear
out of the blue. Indeed, there were several signs that the banks were in
distress well before March 2013, but these were neglected. Indicatively, as
part of a Capital Exercise conducted on October 26, 2011 by the European
Banking Authority (“EBA”) and the Central BOC, BOC identified a capital
buffer of €1.472 billion and CPB identified a capital buffer of € 2.116
billion.76 As a result, at the beginning of November 2011, the credit ratings
agency, Moody’s, downgraded three Cypriot banks. In particular, BOC was
downgraded by one notch to Ba2 from Ba1, Hellenic Bank by one notch to
Ba2 from Ba1, and Marfin Popular Bank Public Co. Ltd. by three notches to
B2 from Ba2.77
Not long after the downgrades, EBA issued its
recommendation on the creation and supervisory oversight of temporary
capital buffers to restore market confidence.78 This recommendation
required national supervisory authorities of participating EU member state
banks to raise their Core Tier 1 Capital to nine percent after accounting for
an additional buffer against stressed sovereign risk holdings by June 30,
2012.
Both BOC and CPB needed additional funding. Correspondingly, on
March 2, 2012, CPB announced a capital-raising plan, but the Greek
Sovereign Bonds Haircut through Private Sector Involvement (“PSI”) had
immediate and devastating implications for both banks. Indeed, the two
banks had purchased large amounts of Greek Government Bonds and lost
billions of euros through the Greek PSI.79 In particular, BOC announced
losses of one billion euros, while CPB announced losses of two and a half
billion euros,80 which further increased the needs for additional capital
buffer. Cyprus could have requested support for its banks by the EU, but
76
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that would have required Cyprus to agree to a Memorandum of
Understanding with the Troika, something that the Cyprus government was
not prepared to do at the time due to the political cost that was at stake once
agreeing to severe austerity measures. Instead, in an attempt to help salvage
CPB, the Cypriot Parliament agreed on May 18, 2012 to underwrite the issue
of €1.8 billion in capital for the bank’s recapitalization, in case the latter was
unable to raise funds from private sources. This underwriting raised state
aid concerns, but it was approved by the European Commission on
September 13, 2012 on the precondition that the Cyprus authorities would
submit a plan no later than six months from the date of the European
Commission’s approval, to demonstrate how the bank would become viable
with the assistance of the state.81
By the deadline of June 30, 2012, CPB had only raised €3 million,
although the Cyprus government acquired bank shares which amounted to
the equivalent of about €1.8 billion.82 The state paid CPB by transferring a
12-month sovereign bond, which would be rolled over for a period of five
years. By that time, all three major credit rating agencies had downgraded
Cyprus’ sovereign debt to junk status, thus eliminating the possibility that
the ECB could accept Cypriot bonds as collateral for a loan.83
On June 25, 2012, Cyprus entered the European Stability Mechanism
(“ESM”) without specifying the amount of money it required, something
that was necessary in order for a Memorandum of Understanding to be
negotiated between Cyprus and the ESM. Unfortunately, a settlement was
not reached until after the Eurogroup meeting on March 15, 2013. In the
meantime, both major banks in Cyprus required Emergency Liquidity
Assistance (“ELA”) from the Central BOC. This was approved by both the
Central BOC and by the ECB. The details of this provision were unknown
at the time, as neither the ECB nor the National Central Banks (“NCBs”),
including the Cyprus Central Bank, publish details on their collateral
holdings that are part of the monetary policy operations of the Eurosystem. 84
As was later revealed, CPB had already resorted to ELA in September 27,
81
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2011,85 initially requesting 300 million euros. That amount grew to 1.8
billion on January 2012, 3.8 billion in May 2012, 4.2 billion by February
2013, and by the time CPB was led into resolution, the amount grew to a
staggering 9.1 billion euros.86
The two banks received ELA from the Central BOC until March 21,
2013, with the consent of the Governing Council of the ECB. On March 21,
2013, the ECB’s Governing Council announced that, in accordance with
prior decisions, on March 25, 2013, it would cease to provide ELA to both
Cypriot banks, due to “the lack of clear and binding policy decisions on
behalf of the Cypriot side to implement a preliminarily agreed financial
assistance programme.”87 However, it was already clear that CPB would
become insolvent by the end of 2012, as it was in no position to service ELA
past June 2012.88
This fact appears to have been known to the ECB. Indicatively, in
response to a request for an opinion on the Cypriot government’s plan for
the recapitalization of CPB, the ECB stated that “the objectives pursued by
the support measures may be better achieved through bank resolution
tools.”89
Hence, the continued provisioning of ELA to CPB was
questionable, as it is contrary to the ECB’s rule that ELA is awarded only to
solvent institutions.90 In an attempt to defend its actions, the Central BOC
argued that not assisting CPB would lead to bankruptcy, which would cause
panic and threaten the entire banking system.91
In addition to the problems with the two major banks, Cyprus also had
to address its own debt. By March 2013, the country was in need of an
estimated 17 billion euros, which corresponded approximately to the size of
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the country’s entire economy.92 Thus, in March 2013, the newly appointed
Cypriot government was faced with a difficult choice: accept the terms of
the bailout programme offered by Troika “as is,” or further delay the
negotiations to achieve a better deal and face possible collapse of its banking
system and economy. The initial deal negotiated by European finance
ministers, the ECB, and the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”), provided
for a one-time “haircut” of 6.75% for deposits of up to €100,000 and 9.99%
for deposits above €100,000. This included all deposits (in current and fixed
deposit accounts, interest bearing or not) and all banks (including branches
of international banks) operating in Cyprus.93 The measure was strongly
criticized as a “disastrous precedent.”94 On March 18, 2013, the bill for said
measure was debated in the Cyprus parliament and was rejected on March
19, 2013.95
On March 21, 2013, the Governing Council of the ECB decided to
maintain the current level of ELA until March 25, 2013. After that, ELA
could only be considered if an EU/IMF program was put in place that would
ensure the solvency of the concerned banks. Thus, the deadline for the
Cypriot government to reach a bailout program was March 25, 2013, after
which “Pandora’s Box” would open.
On March 22, 2013, the Cypriot Parliament focused on negotiations to
find a way to reach a bailout deal before the 25th of March, but this deal
required that Cyprus gather six billion euros to fund its share of the bailout.96
During that period, the Cyprus banking system remained closed and capital
controls were enforced in accordance with the terms of the bailout. In
response to these developments, the Cypriot government enacted eight
distinct laws aimed at emergency assistance for the economy and banks (the
“Bank Resolution Framework”), including Law 17(I)/2013 for the
92
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Consolidation of the Banks. These provisions awarded the Central BOC
extensive powers to enact a series of measures to assist in the consolidation
or liquidation of financial institutions in Cyprus. The law further provided
for the creation of a Consolidation Authority that would act as a “receiver
manager” with extensive authority for the consolidation of the banks.
Finally, on March 25, 2013, a deal was reached. In fact, on the same
day the Eurogroup had made a statement that an agreement had been
reached with the Cypriot authorities on the key elements necessary for a
future macroeconomic adjustment program. The Eurogroup said this
agreement was supported by all euro area member states and by the
Commission, the ECB, and the IMF. The statement contained an annex with
the terms of the Agreement; including the following provisions97:
It was agreed that Cyprus would receive 10 billion euro as
financial assistance; such assistance would not be used to
recapitalize either CPB or BOC. All other banks in Cyprus
would be provided with unlimited funds as needed.
Additionally, the Annex provided for certain measures to be
taken immediately in relation to the two problematic banks:
o CPB would be resolved immediately—with full
contribution of equity shareholders, bond holders and
uninsured depositors—based on the Bank Resolution
Framework. CPB would be separated into a good bank
and a bad bank; the good bank will be folded into BOC
along with 9 billion of ELA, while the bad bank will be
run down over time.
o BOC would be recapitalized through a deposit/equity
conversion of uninsured deposits with full contribution of
equity shareholders and bond holders, so that a capital
ratio of 9% would be secured by the end of the program.
On March 25, 2013, the Governor of the Central BOC placed both
banks into resolution.
On March 26, 2013 the Memorandum of
Understanding was adopted by the ESM and the Republic of Cyprus,
reiterating the terms of the Eurogroup’s announcement. Shortly after, on
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March 29, 2013, the Cyprus Central Bank published two decrees, Decrees
No. 103 and 104, finalizing the agreement reached with the ESM.
V.

THE CYPRUS HAIRCUT: COERCION OR JUST HARD POLITICS?

The Cyprus banking haircut was unprecedented. It is unclear,
however, whether the bail-out terms were wilfully accepted by the Cypriot
government or whether it was coerced and forced to accept same as a “take
it or leave it plan” with the alternative being financial collapse of the
country.
A.

Coercion

Undoubtedly, Cyprus was “forced” to accept some difficult terms.
However, does this mean that the banking haircut of the two major banks in
Cyprus was a product of economic coercion? To analyze whether the facts
of the Cyprus banking haircut satisfy the aforementioned criteria for
economic coercion, this Article will focus on the decision of the Governing
Council of the ECB of March 21, 2013. As a result of this decision, the
provision of ELA to BOC and CPB was to be stopped on March 25, 2013
unless and until Cyprus agreed to a bailout program. To respond to this
question, we must first examine the legal framework surrounding ECB’s
decision. This is the topic to which we now turn.
Primarily, the legal nature of ELA must be identified. ELA is a
temporary measure to support solvent credit institutions that are facing
temporary liquidity problems.98 The provision of ELA is a competence
enjoyed by each member state through their NCBs.99 This discretion falls
outside of the functions that generally arise from their membership in the
European System of Central Banks (“ESCB”) or Eurosystem.100 ELA is
therefore not a monetary policy instrument, nor is it an ESCB or Eurosystem
function; it is awarded by the NCBs. Hence, to a large extent, the provision

98
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of ELA facilities is a national matter governed by the national laws of the
NCB’s state of incorporation under the national NCB legal framework.101
As the NCBs are responsible for granting ELA, they enjoy wide
discretion to decide the terms and conditions on which ELA is offered. In
particular, Article 14.4 of the Statute of the ESCB and the ECB explicitly
stipulates that NCBs may perform functions other than those specified in the
Statute: “Such functions shall be performed on the responsibility and
liability of national central banks and shall not be regarded as being part of
the functions of the ESCB.”102
That said, such discretion should not be exercised in contravention of
other legal obligations of the states or the NCBs. In particular, the granting
of ELA facility to a specific banking institution should not be contrary to
rules on state aid. To this end, the European Commission has issued
guidelines on how state aid rules apply in the case of ELA, recognizing four
conditions which, if met, indicate there is no violation of the state aid rules.
Those conditions are: a) an ELA should be awarded only to solvent, but
illiquid, banking institutions,103 and should be part of a larger “rescue
package” but a limited and exceptional temporary case; b) the facility should
be secured by adequate collateral; c) the Central Bank should impose a
punitive interest rate to the beneficiary institution; and d) ELA should be
provided at NCB’s discretion and should not be supported on or by state’s
guarantees.104
Furthermore, although ELA is not provided within the ESCB
framework, it should not interfere with the objectives and tasks of the ESCB.
The provision of ELA should therefore be consistent with the “monetary
financing prohibition” as defined under Article 123 of the Treaty of the
Functioning of the European Union, which prohibits overdraft facilities or
any other type of credit facility with an NCB in favor of the public sector.
This prohibition includes any financing of the public sector’s obligations
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vis-à-vis third parties.105 The ECB has issued several opinions stressing the
criteria that should be followed by NCB when providing ELA under Article
123. The criteria are: a) the credit provided by the NCB should be provided
for as short a term as possible; b) there must be systemic stability aspects at
stake; c) there must be no doubts as to the legal validity and enforceability of
the state guarantee under applicable national law; and d) there must be no
doubts as to the economic adequacy of the state guarantee, which should
cover both principal and interest on the loans, fully preserving the NCB’s
financial independence.106
Lastly, Article 14.4 of the Statute of the ESCB and the ECB grants the
Governing Council of the ECB the right to stop or restrict an ELA facility
from operating. This can occur if the ECB considers that ELA is interfering
with the objectives and tasks of the Eurosystem and at least two thirds of the
votes cast oppose to further ELA. It is for these reasons that a NCB granting
ELA must inform the ECB of all relevant details within two days.107
The Governing Council of ECB’s March 21, 2013 decision to
maintain the ELA level granted until March 25, 2013 was founded exactly
on Article 14.4. As can be determined from the wording of Article 14.4,
there are two conditions that should be met for the Governing Council to
decide to terminate or otherwise restrict ELA. The first one is procedural
and dictates that such a decision should be taken and ratified by at least two
thirds of the votes. The second one is substantive and provides that the
decision should be based on the premise that the continuation of ELA would
impair some specific object and task of the Eurosystem. The second
condition cannot be subject to review by any state (or other European
institutions, for that matter) and is decided solely on the Governing
Council’s discretion. To the extent that the procedural condition of
receiving at least two thirds of the votes was met, the decision of the
Governing Council of March 21, 2013 can be considered justified.
However, it is necessary to examine whether the exercise of such discretion
constitutes coercion. This is the topic to which we now turn.
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Theories of Coercion

As discussed above, the definition of economic coercion is not settled
in international scholarship, is complicated, and requires examination of
several factors. Nonetheless, this Article will examine whether the facts of
the Cyprus banking haircut can satisfy the aforementioned criteria, which
have been recognized by different scholars as ingredients of economic
coercion.
The first criterion proposed by Professor Bowett requires an improper
motive or intent on the part of the state performing the coercive act.108 Such
intent should be primarily for the purpose of damaging the economy of
another state or as a means of coercing another state.109 The question here,
therefore, is whether the ECB acted with an improper motive for the purpose
of damaging the Cypriot economy when it suddenly decided to stop the
provision of ELA to Cyprus’ second largest bank. As discussed above, the
intent of a state or an EU institution is not easy to detect, let alone prove. It
would require a thorough examination of the surrounding situations. In the
case of the Cyprus banking haircut, the decision of the Governing Council of
the ECB was made at a time when CPB had already been insolvent for
several months, raising suspicions that the ECB decision might have been
coercive. That said, at that period, the Cyprus government’s six-month
deadline to present a viability plan for CPB to the EU Commission had just
expired. Furthermore, the ECB, as will be discussed below in detail, acted
legally and in accordance with its policy when it decided to stop funding the
insolvent CPB. Thus, although the timing of the decision, the very short
notice given by ECB prior to the implementation of the decision, and the
unprecedented terms of the bailout program certainly raise some questions
regarding ECB’s motives, these motives do not clearly indicate coercive
intent. It is therefore very difficult to demonstrate persuasively that the ECB
intended to damage the Cyprus economy.
Furthermore, it is not
demonstrably within ECB’s interest to inflict this damage since it would
ultimately hurt ECB’s goals of price stability.
For ECB’s decision to constitute coercion under the second criterion,
ECB must have acted to obtain some benefit of any kind by subordinating
Cypriot sovereignty. Any claim that ECB aimed to obtain specific benefits
108
109
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by exercising pressure on the Cypriot government is not supported by any
official documentation. The decision was made in accordance with Article
14 of the ECBS Statute to safeguard Eurosystem’s tasks and goals and to
restore legality under ECB’s statute. Furthermore, it cannot be claimed
effectively that the ECB subordinated the sovereignty of the Cypriot state, as
Cyprus has itself awarded such powers to the ECB.
The last criterion requires that the coercion be tantamount to force in
the sense that it can endanger the coerced state’s security, economy, and
other structures. Certainly, the imminent collapse of the Cypriot Banking
System was a credible threat to Cyprus’ social security, safety, and
economy, and could be directly linked with the ECB’s decision. Even so,
ECB was not responsible for the financial position of CPB and the latter’s
insolvency, nor for the dire state of the Cyprus economy, which was clearly
attributed to the inadequate management of the Bank and to the Cypriot
government.110 Professor Tom Farer argues that non-concession of
assistance or aid to another state falls short of coercion in every case, as a
state is always free to decide whether to continue providing assistance on the
basis of each state’s own interests.111 In this case, therefore, the ECB’s
decision to cease providing ELA to the Cypriot banks cannot be classified as
coercive.
As such, it does not appear clear that the Cypriot government was
coerced into agreeing to the bailout program. Even if that was the case,
however, not all forms of coercion are illegal under international law, as
indicated below.
1.

Retorsion and Reprisals

Not all hostile and unfriendly competitive acts can be considered
illegal coercion. Indeed, international law recognizes that a state is free to
respond to an injurious act done by another state through a hostile, yet legal,
act.112 Such acts of retorsion are considered a state’s means of self-help
when it is subjected to an illegal act. Retorsions aim to compel the party
acting illegally to rescind such an act.
110
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Overall, acts of retorsion are deemed legal, even in the absence of a
previous injurious act, since states retain the right to be unfriendly to one
another in pursuit of their interests.113 However, some commentators have
argued that if retorsion is in pursuit of a wrongful end, such as an act for the
sole aim of causing harm to another state, it becomes illegal.114 Once the act
ceases to be legal, it no longer constitutes retorsion. Hence, retorsion falls
short of coercion in the legal sense of the term. If a hostile act is of such
degree so as to constitute coercion, it is considered a prohibited intervention
under international law and no longer qualifies as retorsion.115 Retorsion is
distinguished from reprisals in that reprisals are in themselves illegal acts,
which are justified under international law as a response to a previous
violation of the law by the state at which the reprisal is directed.116 Reprisals
are allowed under international law, allowing states to respond to a prior
illegal act as means of “self-help.”
Self-help is a necessary remedy since international law does not
provide an effective enforcement mechanism.117 There is no “Court [or]
central authority above the Sovereign States which could compel a
delinquent State to give reparation.”118 The Naulilaa arbitration case
provided the classic definition of the term reprisal and its elements,
providing that:
Reprisals are an act of self-help on the part of the injured states,
responding after an unsatisfied demand to an act contrary to
international law on the part of the offending State . . . . They
would be illegal if a previous act contrary to international law
had not furnished the reason for them. They aim to impose on
the offending State reparation for the offense or the return to
legality in avoidance of new offenses.119
113
114
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Reprisals can constitute a form of coercion.
International defines reprisals as:
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[M]easures of coercion, derogating from the ordinary rules of
the law of the people, determined and taken by a State,
following the commission of illicit acts against it by another
State, and having as their aim to impose on the second State,
through pressure exerted by means of harm, a return to
legality.120
Traditionally, reprisals included any illegal act, including measures of
economic coercion as well as armed attacks.121 The term, however, has been
replaced by two concepts: belliquent, or self-defense, reprisals used in armed
conflict, and countermeasures, or those reprisals of a non-forcible nature.122
Economic coercion can be considered a type of countermeasure.
Countermeasures are an exception to the rule that coercion constitutes
an illegal intervention in that they are not illegal per se, but can be justified,
provided certain conditions are met.123 This is recognized by the Draft
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,
(“DASR”). Although DASR is not a multinational convention, it codifies
customary law.124 Indeed, Article 22 of the DASR provides that “[t]he
wrongfulness of an act of a state not in conformity with an international
obligation towards another state is precluded if and to the extent that the act
constitutes a countermeasure,” provided certain substantive and procedural
conditions are met.125 Such substantive and procedural conditions constitute
the limits of countermeasures.
If these conditions are not met,
countermeasures are illegal as coercive acts. The same principle is reiterated
on Article 22 of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of International
Organisations (“DARIO”), which aim to clarify the circumstances under
which an international organization is liable for breach of an international
120
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obligation and the consequences of such breach. It must be stipulated that
DARIO does not enjoy the status of customary law, as is the case with
DASR. In fact, DARIO has been met with skepticism by states,
international organizations, and academics. Nonetheless, as argued by
Professor Kristina Daugirdas, DARIO may become customary law.126 Thus,
these conditions provide a means for testing whether the Cyprus bank
haircut was the result of coercive actions. We shall now examine the
substantive and procedural conditions that constitute the limits of
countermeasures.
2.

Limits of Countermeasures

Initially, arbitral tribunals, such as in the Naulilaa arbitration, set out
certain conditions that must be met for countermeasures to be legal.127 The
Naulilaa decision indicates that for countermeasures to be legal, (1) they
must be executed only by a state through its institutions; (2) they must be
proportionate; and (3) they must follow an illicit act where negotiations to
restore legality have failed.128
These criteria were re-affirmed in the arbitration case Air Service
Agreement, which referred exclusively to countermeasures.129 This case
examined the decision of the United States to ban certain French flights from
landing in the United States following France’s decision to prohibit Pan
American passengers from disembarking in Paris. France’s decision was
due to an alleged breach of the 1946 bilateral agreement between France and
the U.S., which provided for civil air flights between the two countries. The
tribunal reaffirmed states’ rights to resort to countermeasures but noted that
such measures should 1) be relevant to a previous violation by the state
receiving the countermeasures and 2) be proportionate in light of the
previous violation. In relation to the third requirement, which was upheld in
the Naulilaa case—namely that a countermeasure should constitute the last
resort following failed negotiations—the Tribunal in the Service Agreement
case reasoned that starting countermeasures during negotiations was not

126
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127
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129
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prohibited. Similar recognition of the legitimacy of countermeasures was
indicated in the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project130 and the Cysne131 cases.
These conditions were codified in Article 22 of the DASR, which
echoes customary law. Furthermore, Articles 49–51 of the DASR outline
the limits of economic countermeasures. Such limits are separated in
substantive and procedural limits; the procedural limits are set in Article 49,
while Articles 50 and 51 set out the substantive limits. According to Article
49, countermeasures are permissible if taken by an injured state to induce the
responsible state to cease its internationally wrongful conduct. This upholds
the principle initially set out in the GabčÌkovo-Nagymaros Project case,132
by virtue of which the existence of an internationally wrongful act is a
prerequisite for the justification of a countermeasure.133 This leads to the
following conclusions:
Primarily, countermeasures may only be taken against the
violating state, and acts directed against third states would not
be justified as countermeasures. That said, if countermeasures
taken against the violating state also indirectly affect third
states, this alone does not necessarily render a countermeasure
illegal under Article 22 of the DASR.134
Secondly, countermeasures can only be taken by an injured
state, meaning that non-injured states may not affect
countermeasures. That said, in case there is a serious violation
of an obligation owed to the international community as a
whole, any state may take countermeasures.135
Lastly, countermeasures may be taken to induce a state to cease
its internationally wrongful conduct. A countermeasure cannot
be justified if it goes beyond the goal of economic inducement
to economic coercion, forcing the other state to do something it
is not obligated to do under international law.136 This also
means that countermeasures should cease as soon as their aim
130
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of inducement is met, and shouldn’t continue thereafter as they
would no longer constitute a response to an illegal act.
The wrongfulness of an international act can only be judged retrospectively,
so a state resorting to countermeasures due to alleged wrongful violations
does so at its own peril.137
Apart from the procedural limits described above, Articles 50 and 51
of the DASR set various substantive conditions for counter measures to be
justified. Article 50 provides that countermeasures should refrain from
violating international obligations regarding the use of force, fundamental
human rights, obligations of a humanitarian character prohibiting reprisals,
and obligations under peremptory norms of general international law.
Lastly, Article 51 sets a substantive limit on the nature and extent of
countermeasures, providing that countermeasures should respect the
principle of proportionality. Proportionality requires that adoption of
countermeasures does not lead to inequitable results.
Hence, for
countermeasures to be proportionate, they should assess both the amount of
injury suffered and the nature of the rights in question and the seriousness of
the breach.138 The reference to “the rights in question” should be broadly
interpreted so as to refer not only to the rights infringed but also to the rights
of the violating state.139 Considering this, punitive countermeasures will
likely never be permitted under international law.140
In relation to the limits set to countermeasures taken by an
international organization against a state, DARIO does not specifically
regulate this issue, but Article 22 of DARIO refers to the “substantive and
procedural conditions required by international law.”
As per the
commentary of DARIO, Articles 49 to 54 of DASR should be applied
respectively.141
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The Article will now examine whether the Governing Council of
ECB’s March 21, 2013 decision, if deemed coercive, can be justified as a
countermeasure or an act of retorsion. As we have already established the
decision of March 21, 2013 was legal, it is an act of retorsion, which is
permitted under international law even if it is punitive or hostile so long as it
is proportionate.
In this analysis, coercion would only need to be examined if ECB’s
decision was illegal; however, as analyzed above, we cannot classify ECB’s
decision as illegal under any of the coercion criteria, given that ECB acted
within its scope of powers and rightfully exercised its discretion. Even if
ECB’s decision was deemed illegal, ECB could raise the defense of
countermeasures given that all the respective conditions are met; namely,
Cyprus may have been in breach of an obligation due to the EU under the
Stability and Growth Pact, which is a pre-condition for EU Membership.
The Stability and Growth Pact requires that all member states’ government
debt/GDP ratio is not over the 60%. Cyprus’ government debt to GDP ratio
was well above the relevant threshold in 2010, 2011, and 2012, and reached
102% in 2013. It can be argued further that ECB’s decision of March 21,
2013 that “ELA would be continued if and only if a programme was in place
that would ensure the solvency of the banks concerned,”142 was made as a
direct consequence of that breach. Indeed, ELA could not continue to be
given to an insolvent bank. This would be a credit facility aimed to defer
government-funded recapitalization, in breach of Article 123 of the Treaty of
the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”), which prohibits the
financing of public budgets in member states through the ECB and the
NCB.143
To conclude, establishing liability for European institutions on the
grounds of economic coercion, illegal retorsion or non-proportional
countermeasure appears to be a very difficult task for Cyprus. Investors
would be barred from even bringing such claims, as DARIO is not binding
at its present state, but also can only be invoked by states and international
organizations and not by individuals. This analysis indicates that it is a
142
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difficult task for investors to render European institutions liable or co-liable
for such losses.
C.

Basing Liability on Other Grounds

Due to these difficulties, it is worth exploring whether investors can
base their claim against European institutions for losses associated with
financial distress measures on other grounds, especially on the TFEU. To
this end, this Article will examine available remedies under the TFEU.
1.

Article 263 of the TFEU: Annulment of Illegal Actions

Article 263 of the TFEU contains a provision allowing judicial review
of the acts of EU institutions. In particular, it allows, inter alia, individuals
to bring actions in the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”)
against EU institutions that have acted illegally. 144 However, before
individuals can demonstrate that the EU institution’s act is illegal, they must
first demonstrate they have fulfilled the locus standi preconditions set out in
the relevant article. It is worth mentioning that before the Treaty of Lisbon,
Article 263 had been scarcely used as a means of enforcing individual rights
due to the onerous requirements that individual applicants must meet,
namely that the act was a matter of “direct and individual concern” to
them.145 Indeed, in the leading Plaumann case, the Court held that an
applicant would be successful in showing that he had direct and individual
concern by a decision, only “if that decision affects them by reason of
certain attributes which are peculiar to them or by reason of circumstances in
which they are differentiated from all other persons and by virtue of these
factors distinguishes them individually just as in the case of the person
addressed.”146
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Following the Treaty of Lisbon, the conditions for the admissibility of
actions brought by individuals have been eased, depending on the act
challenged, so that individual applicants can now challenge:
An act addressed to them;
An act addressed to another person, which was of direct and
individual concern to them; or
A regulatory act which was of direct concern to him and did not
entail implementing measures.147
In relation to what constitutes a regulatory act, Professor De Witte
argues that it is tantamount to non-legislative acts, that is, “acts not adopted
in accordance with the ordinary or special legislative procedure.”148 Such
acts, according to Girón Larrucea, need not directly affect an addressee,
“except for the sole reason that they are one of the participants in a certain
area of activity for the general regulation of which the act was adopted.”149
Decisions of EU Institutions made in the framework of sovereign
default, which constitutes exceptional circumstances, are likely to be
regulatory acts, although this is not always the case. This issue was
examined by the General Court when distressed depositors from the Cyprus
Bank that had sustained haircuts in their bank deposits resorted to the court
requesting the cancellation of the sale of operation in CPB in cases T-327/13
through Τ-331/13.150 The applicants in all five cases turned against the
European Commission and the ECB, as, according to the applicants, the
decision of the Eurogroup of March 25, 2013 should be attributed to them.
In their view, the decrees issued by the Cyprus Central Bank were simply
putting Eurogroup’s statement into effect. Their main argument was that the
Eurogroup’s decision of the 25th of March, which was materialized through
the Banking Resolution Framework (Decree No. 103 and 104 of the
Governor of Cyprus Central Bank as the representative and/or agent of the
European System of Central Banks), was in excess of Eurogroup’s power
147

Richard Lang, Quite a Challenge: Article 263(4) TFEU and the Case of the Mystery Measures,
SSRN ELECTRONIC J. 2 (2011).
148
Floris De Witte, The European Judiciary After Lisbon, 15 J. EUR. & COMP. L. 43, 47 (2008).
149
JA GIRÓN LARRUCEA, EL SISTEMA JURÍDICO DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA: LA REFORMA REALIZADA EN
EL TRATADO DE LISBOA 267, (Tirant lo Blanch, Valencia 2008); but see De Witte, supra note 148, at 47.
150
Case T-327/13 Mallis and Mallis v Commission and ECB, Case T-328/13 Tameio Pronoias
Prosopikou Trapezis Kyprou v Commission and ECB, Case T-329/13 Chatzithoma v Commission and
ECB, Case T-330/13 Chatziioannou v Commission and ECB, and Case T-331/13 Nikolaou v Commission
and ECB.

April 2018

Is the EU to Blame?

515

and authorities and thus intervening on Cyprus’ sovereignty. The General
Court initially examined whether the Eurogroup statement could, in fact, be
attributed to the ECB or the European Commission, as otherwise the
application would be inadmissible.151 The General Court concluded that the
Eurogroup is an informal discussion forum at ministerial level between
representatives of the member states whose currency is the euro, without any
legislative decision-making competences.152 The General Court noted that,
despite ECB’s participation in its meetings, its actions could not be
attributed to the ECB or the European Commission.153 The General Court
further considered if the statement could be attributed to the ESM, rather
than to the Eurogroup. The applicants claimed that, in such case, the act
would be attributable to the ECB. The General Court ruled, however, that,
even in such case, this fact would still not allow the inference that the
Commission or the ECB instigated the adoption of that statement.154 As
such, it ruled that an annulment was not possible under Article 263 of the
TFEU and that the application was inadmissible. The case would be
different if the statement was issued by the Council under its ECOFIN
configuration, as in such a case, the Decrees 103 and 104 would in fact be
implementing EU law.155
The decision of the General Court was appealed (Joined Cases C105/15 P to C-109/15 P), but the CJEU upheld the dismissal. The CJEU
reiterated that the Eurogroup’s statement could not be regarded as a joint
decision of the Commission and the ECB. Under the ESM framework, these
bodies did not have the power to make decisions of their own under the
ESM Treaty and the mere participation of the EU Commission and the ECB
in the meetings of the Eurogroup was not sufficient to alter the nature of
Eurogroup’s statements and render such statements the expression of a
decision-making power of the ECB and the EU Commission. Finally, the
CJEU noted that, as Cyprus adopted the legal framework for the banks’
restructuring, this cannot be regarded as having been imposed by an alleged

151

Case T-327/13 Mallis and Mallis v Commission and ECB, at 30-34.
Id. at 53.
153
Id. at 42.
154
Id. at 43.
155
See Anastasios A. Antoniou, Original Sin: the EU tampering with the right to property in Cyprus
is an unprecedented departure from EU norms and shared constitutional rights, EUTOPIA LAW (Mar. 19,
2013)
https://eutopialaw.com/2013/03/19/original-sin-the-eu-tampering-with-the-right-to-property-incyprus-is-an-unprecedented-departure-from-eu-norms-and-shared-constitutional-rights/.
152

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

516

VOL. 27 NO. 2

decision jointly taken by the EU Commission and the ECB expressed in the
Eurogroup statement.
Therefore, only in cases where investors can prove an act was
addressed to them, was a direct and individual concern to them, or was a
regulatory act can investors challenge the legality of an act taken by an EU
Institution within the framework of sovereign default to the extent, of
course, that such an act directly affects the interests of such investors.
However, for investors to succeed, they must further demonstrate that such
act actually contradicts EU Law, something that seems difficult to do given
the wide discretion that is enjoyed by EU institutions in this field.
2.

Article 265 of the TFEU: Complaint for Failure to Act

Article 265 of the TFEU provides that, in cases where a European
Institution has an affirmative duty—and not just discretionary power—to act
but failed to do so, such inaction can be deemed an infringement of the
TFEU and, as such, an illegal omission.156 This article applies specifically
in cases of inaction by European institutions when there was a legal
obligation to act, and thus, “inaction” means non-adoption of a legal act.157
To this end, Article 265 does not apply to negative acts.
If the European Court rules that there was in fact an infringement of
EU law due to inaction, it will order the respective institutions to take all
necessary actions to remedy the omission.158 Article 265 differentiates
between privileged and non-privileged investors, with the former comprised
of member states and institutions of the EU and the latter private parties who
have a limited right of locus standi159 in that they must have a personal
interest in taking action in order to bring proceedings before the Court of
Justice.160 In particular, the Court has stressed on several occasions that
applications by individuals should be limited to decisions addressed to
individuals.161
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An action based on Article 265 can be brought only against an EU
institution (the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the
Commission, or the ECB).162 This course of action might be used by
investors where an EU institution failed to take action it was legally required
to take to avert or minimize investors’ losses due to sovereign default. The
crucial element for investors is to demonstrate that the EU institution has
unlawfully failed to act when such action was required by EU law. In such a
case, investors could resort to the CJEU, provided they had followed the
procedural conditions provided for in Article 265, including the preliminary
procedure.163
To explore whether investors can resort to this alternative, this Article
will once again explore the case of CPB. In the case of CPB, it is striking
that, although CPB was insolvent and this was known to ECB, the Cyprus
Central Bank continued to provide ELA to it nonetheless. This continued
funding was contrary to Article 123 of the TFEU and ECB’s policy. Even
so, however, it must be remembered that ECB did not have a duty to
intervene and stop ELA before the situation devolved so dramatically.
Indeed, the provision of ELA is a national matter, while NCBs and
respective national authorities maintain ultimate responsibly for prudential
supervision of eurozone banks.164 Indeed, in accordance with TFEU, ECB
had no duty to maintain financial stability; 165 rather, ECB’s authority is
limited to “contribut[ing] to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the
competent authorities.”166 To this end, ECB had no duty to stop the Cyprus
NBC from granting ELA to CPB and in fact the Governing Council’s March
21, 2013 decision was a negative action that does not justify the use of
TFEU Article 265.
It is therefore difficult to imagine that in matters of extreme financial
distress, where national states still enjoy exclusive sovereignty to decide,
there will be situations where EU institutions have a duty to act to prevent a
decision or situation personally affecting investors.
162
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Non-Contractual Liability of EU Institutions

Finally, it is worth examining the non-contractual liability of EU
institutions, which can be found in Article 340 of the TFEU. The article
provides that the EU shall make good on damage caused by its institutions.
The definition of attributable acts includes wrongful omissions.167 In the
case C-352/98 Bergaderm, the CJEU set out a set of conditions that must be
met for establishing the existence of liability under Article 340 of the
TFEU.168 These are:
The rule of law which has been breached must be one which
is intended to confer rights on individuals. Here, later case
law has adopted a more liberal approach.169 In particular,
the Kampffmeyer case170 established that it suffices to show
that the rule infringed was intended generally for the
protection of individuals, and not necessary that the
applicant was “directly and individually concerned” as
required in Article 263 of the TFEU. Indicatively, in the
more recent case, Camos Grau v. Commission, the
requirement of impartiality into the conduct of Commission
employees was found to aim not only to the respect of the
public interest, but also to confer a right to individuals to see
that the corresponding guarantees are complied with; 171
The breach must be sufficiently serious to merit an award of
damages;172 and,
There must be a direct causal link between the infringement
of the rule and the damage suffered by the claimant.173
All three conditions governing the EU’s liability must jointly be
satisfied. If one of them is not fulfilled, the application is dismissed in its
entirety without the necessity for the Union courts to examine the remaining
conditions for such liability. The Case T-79/13 Accorinti v. ECB is
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indicative of this matter.174 The case revolved around the Greek Sovereign
Bonds Haircut through Private Sector Involvement (PSI). It was filed by
Allessandro Accortini along with over 200 plaintiffs from Italy, all holders of
Greek Sovereign bonds.
Plaintiffs claimed that, by virtue of the Exchange Agreement of
February 15, 2012 and the ECB’s Decision 2012/153/EU, which provided
that Greek bonds had to be guaranteed by the Greek government in favor of
the ECB and the NBCs in order to be eligible for Eurosystem operations,
ECB and the NBCs received preferential treatment over all other holders of
Greek Sovereign bonds.175 Plaintiffs claimed the above constituted a breach
of the principle of equal treatment amongst private creditors, while the fact
that the ECB was buying Greek sovereign bonds while issuing calming
statements for private investors was infringing their legitimate expectations
and the principle of legal certainty. For these they claimed damages of more
than 12.5 million euros in accordance with Article 268 and 340 of the TFEU.
As noted above, Article 340 of the TFEU provides the cumulative
conditions that must be satisfied for the European Union to be liable under
non-contractual liability. In particular, these are: a) that the institution must
act unlawfully, b) actual damage must have been suffered and c) lastly, there
must be a causal link between the unlawful and the damage pleaded.176 The
General Court in the Accorinti case concluded that the first condition of
Article 340, namely the existence of an unlawful conduct, was not fulfilled,
as the ECB acted within the discretion awarded to it by Articles 127 and 282
of the TFEU and therefore acted in compliance with EU law. The General
Court concluded that bond holders’ losses could not be attributed to the
ECB, as economic risks are inherent in the commercial activities carried out
in the financial sector. To this end, private investors could not rely on the
principle of the protection of legitimate expectations or on the principle of
legal certainty.
Furthermore, the General Court found that ECB’s statements were
generic and bondholders, as diligent and well-informed investors, should
have had knowledge of the highly unstable economic circumstances
surrounding the Greek sovereign bonds. The Court further concluded that in
all cases, the decision of the Greek sovereign debt restructuring was made by
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the Greek government, which enjoyed exclusive competence on this matter
and could not be attributed to the ECB. Lastly, the General Court rejected
the argument that the general principle of equal treatment could apply
between private investors and the ECB as some were not in a comparable
situation, given the different motives that had driven them, namely public
interest in the case of ECB and the pursuit of private profit in the case of
private investors. Greece, and not the ECB, was only bound under pari
passu clauses in the Greek sovereign bonds to ensure equal treatment of
investors by ensuring that bonds were treated on “the same level footing
without preference or priority among themselves . . . .”177 The General
Court dismissed the application on the above grounds.
The same result was also reached in the case Nausicaa Anadyomène
SAS and Banque d’escompte v. ECB,178 which was based on the same set of
facts. The General Court found that the ECB had not infringed the
legitimate expectations of the private holders of Greek bonds, the principle
of legal certainty, or the principle of equal treatment of private creditors.
The Court said that, in a field such as that of monetary policy, which is
subject to constant changes, commercial banks may not rely upon the
principle of the protection of legitimate expectations or upon the principle of
legal certainty.179 Hence, as the ECB had not actively encouraged investors
to acquire or retain Greek debt instruments through its acts or statements, the
General Court held that the ECB is not bound to compensate the loss
sustained by commercial banks holding Greek debt instruments by the
restructuring of Greek debt.180
The CJEU also examined the partial annulment of the Memorandum
of Understanding of April 26, 2013 entered between Cyprus and the ESM in
the Ledra Advertising Limited Joined Cases T 289-/13 to T-291/13. In those
cases, applicants were depositors that claimed specific provisions of the
Memorandum were in breach of human rights considerations, referring to
the European Convention of Human Rights and the EU Charter of Human
Rights.181 Initially, the General Court did not examine the merits of the
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cases, but ruled the claims inadmissible. Although the EU Commission
signed the Memorandum, it had done so on behalf of the ESM and so, as
with the activities pursued by the Commission and the ECB in the context of
the ESM, only the ESM is committed. As such, as “neither the ESM nor the
Republic of Cyprus is among the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of
the European Union, the General Court has no jurisdiction to examine the
legality of acts which they have adopted together.”182 The cases were
appealed in the CJEU and, on September 20, 2016, the CJEU set aside the
previous judgement and proceeded to examine the case on its merits. 183 On
the grounds of admissibility, the CJEU held that, as the EU Commission acts
as the guardian of the EU treaties, it must therefore refrain from signing a
Memorandum of Understanding whose consistency with EU law is
questionable, as would be the case in the event of breach of the EU Charter
of Fundamental Rights.184 On the merits, the CJEU held that, considering
the imminent risk of financial losses that would have been sustained by
depositors if the banking system had collapsed, the measures did not
constitute a disproportionate and intolerable interference with the appellants’
right to property and therefore there was no breach of the Charter.185 Hence,
the CJEU found that the EU Commission was not in breach and thus the
conditions of Article 340 were not met.186
The above case demonstrates the large discretion enjoyed by EU
institutions and the difficulties to attach liability to them for actions related
to measures taken in case of sovereign default, especially when such
institutions have acted lawfully within their wide discretionary powers.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In cases of sovereign default, investors often sustain significant losses
and are left looking for remedies. Recognizing the responsible actors is of
paramount importance as it dictates the available remedies for investors. In
particular, when an action can be attributed to multiple actors, investors may
have additional legal recourse. Additionally, the party responsible may
182

Id. at ¶ 58.
Joined cases C-8/15P to C-10/15P Ledra Advertising Ltd v. Comm’n and European Central Bank,
2016 E.C.R. at ¶ 78.
184
Case T-289/13 Ledra Advertising Ltd. v. European Comm’n and European Central Bank 2014
E.C.R. ¶ 58.
185
Id.
186
Id.
183

522

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 27 NO. 2

impact competent Courts, applicable law, and available property for
enforcement.
In the recent case of the Cyprus banking haircut, investors were told
by the Cypriot President that the measures leading to the haircut were
attributable to the EU and its institutions. To this end, several investors
brought claims against Eurogroup and the ECB.
This Article examined whether, in fact, liability could be attributed to
the EU for the acts of a member state. As demonstrated above, there are
several bases upon which investors can claim compensation from EU
institutions in the framework of sovereign default within the EU. However,
none of these conditions are easy to identify or fulfill.
Primarily, investors can examine whether sovereign actions can be
attributed to EU institutions through coercion. As noted above, this is
difficult to prove, since economic coercion is not as clear as military
coercion and its definition is vague and subject to interpretation on a caseby-case basis. Even if coercion is found, investors might still be unable to
succeed if the coercion was a countermeasure that could justify an otherwise
illegal act. In this respect, TFEU might offer some other alternatives.
However, case law seems too restrictive of such claims, which must be
examined on a case-by-case basis. Thus, investors are unlikely to succeed in
their claims against EU institutions in the case of sovereign default, as the
concept of sovereignty imposes several obstacles on investors seeking
remedies against EU institutions in case of sovereign default.

